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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Jurisdiction is proper in this Court pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. § 78-2a-3 (1953) and Rule 4(a) of the Rules of the Utah
Court of Appeals.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a conviction for Driving Under the
Influence of an Alcoholic Beverage after a jury trial which was
held on January 26, 1988, and the Judgment of Conviction, which
was rendered against the Appellant on February 22, 1988, by the
Honorable Mark S. Johnson, Fourth Circuit Court for Davis County.
STATEMENT OF ISSUE ON APPEAL
1.

Whether or not the failure of the Trial Court to

instruct the jury on the definition of the term "actual physical
control", an element of the offense charged, Driving Under the
Influence of an Alcoholic Beverage, constitutes reversible error.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Appellant was charged by Information with driving or
being in actual physical control of a motor vehicle on November
10, 1987.

At the trial, no evidence was presented that any

No transcript has been ordered or prepared for the Appeal.
The parties have stipulated to an Agreed Statement As The Record
On Appeal. All references herein are to the paragraphs in the
Agreed Statement (hereinafter "A.S.")
1

police officer or other witness had seen the Appellant driving a
motor vehicle on November 10, 1987. The City did introduce
testimony from Officer Jim Garner that he had observed the
Appellant behind the wheel of an automobile at approximately 810
East 500 South in Bountiful, Utah.

Officer Garner testified that

the vehicle was not moving, and that he never saw the Appellant
actually driving said vehicle (A.S. 1, 2). Field sobriety tests
were administered and the Appellant was arrested for Driving
Under the Influence of an Alcoholic Beverage (A.S. 6). The
Appellant refused to submit to a chemical test (A.S. 7).
The Appellant testified on his own behalf.

He testified

that he drove to Wendover, Nevada, and on the return from
Wendover, the Appellant admitted consuming two (2) beers. The
Appellant also admitted that he had been the driver of the
vehicle (A.S. 8). He further testified that he opened a beer
after his vehicle ran out of gas.

He stated that he drank about

half of that beer prior to the time that Officer Garner arrived
at the scene and observed the Appellant's motor vehicle stopped
along the roadway (A.S. 9).
After the Trial Court read all of the instructions to the
jury, the City's attorney requested permission to approach the
bench.

At that time, the City's attorney requested that the

Court include in the elements instruction to the jury that the

2

Appellant could be found guilty of the offense of Driving Under
the Influence if the City proved beyond a reasonable doubt that
the Appellant was either driving an automobile on November 10,
1987, or that the Appellant was in actual physical control of a
motor vehicle on the same date (A.S. 10). Appellant's counsel
urged that it would be necessary to define the legal term of artf
"actual physical control"f in order for the jury to understand
the elements of the offense (A.S. 11). The Trial Court
instructed Appellant's counsel to prepare such an instruction.
Appellant's counsel did prepare such an instruction and tendered
it to the Court.

The Court refused to give the instruction, and

Appellant's counsel excepted to the Court's failure to give said
instruction (A.S. 11).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The term "actual physical control" is a term of art, and is
not self-explanatory.

The Appellant was entitled to a basic

"elements" instruction to the jury.

The Trial Court's refusal to

submit the proffered instruction to the jury, believing that the
jury would understand the term "actual physical control", constituted reversible error.

The jury was not instructed concerning

the elements of the alleged crime, and therefore it cannot be
determined whether or not the jury properly found each element of
the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.

3

ARGUMENT
1

•

AN ACCURATE INSTRUCTION UPON THE BASIC ELEMENTS
OF DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE IS ESSENTIAL,
AND THE FAILURE TO INSTRUCT THE JURY ON THE
DEFINITION OF THE TERM "ACTUAL PHYSICAL CONTROL"
CONSTITUTES REVERSIBLE ERROR,

The Utah Supreme Court has consistently ruled that an
accurate instruction upon the basic elements of the offense
charged is essential, and the failure to so instruct constitutes
reversible error.

In State v. Laine, 618 P.2d 33 (Utah 1980),

the Supreme Court ruled that the failure of the Trial Judge to
include the intent element in the basic "elements" instruction in
a prosecution for theft by deception was reversible error.

The

Court reached this conclusion even though one of the instructions
included the "Information" instruction which did refer to the
intent required for the commission of the crime, but did "not
inform the members of the jury that before returning the verdict,
they must find beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant had the
conscious objective to withhold the property (automobile) permanently."

Id. at 35.

The Laine holding was reaffirmed by the Utah Supreme Court
in State v. Harmon, 712 P.2d 219 (Utah 1986).

The Harmon case

presents a virtually identical factual scenario as that presented
in the instant matter.

There the defendant was charged by an

Information with robbery, but at trial, the Court granted the

4

State's motion to instruct the jury on the lesser included
offense of Attempted Robbery.

In its instructions to the juryf

however, the Court merely inserted the word "attempted" before
the word "robbery" in the previously prepared instruction on the
elements of robbery and then read that to the jury as the elements instruction for attempted robbery.

The Court failed to

instruct the jury on the specific definition of an attempt.
In Harmon, the defendant, just as in the case at bar,
objected to the Court's instruction and requested an instruction
defining the word "attempt".

The trial court refused the defen-

dant's proffered instruction, instead believing the jury would
understand the word "attempt".

Because the jury was not

instructed concerning the elements of the crime for which the
defendant was convicted, the Court citing State v. Laine, granted
the defendant a new trial.
In the instant matter, the failure of the Trial Court to
define "actual physical control" constitutes reversible error
because in the absence of such an instruction, it cannot be
determined whether or not the jury properly found each element of
the crime of Driving Under the Influence beyond a reasonable
doubt.

This is so because the jury could have logically

concluded that the City had not proven beyond a reasonable doubt
that the Appellant was actually driving a motor vehicle while

5

under the influence of an alcoholic beverage.

Although the

Appellant did admit to drinking two beers during his drive from
Wendover to Bountiful, a jury could have logically concluded that
two beers consumed over several hours prior to the driving at
issue was not a sufficient quantity of alcohol to appreciably
impair the Appellant's ability to safely operate a motor vehicle.
Thus, if the jury concluded that it was appropriate to
acquit the Appellant on the driving alternative of Driving Under
the Influence, then the jury's verdict could only be supported if
they concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that the Appellant was
in "actual physical control" of an operable motor vehicle.

The

Appellant did admit that he had consumed about one-half of a beer
after his vehicle had run out of gasf and prior to the time that
the arresting officer arrived at the scene.

The jury could have

concluded that even though the Appellant was not guilty under the
driving alternative, that he was guilty under the actual physical
control alternative since, by his own testimony, he had consumed
two and a half beers by that point in time.

Laine and Harmon

mandate the granting of a new trial in the case at bar.

Just as

in Harmon, "actual physical control" is a term of art and is not
self-explanatory.

The Appellant is entitled to a basic

"elements" instruction.

Because the jury was left to guess at

the meaning of "actual physical control", the Trial Court's

6

failure to instruct the jury on the basic elements was reversible
error.
CONCLUSION AND RELIEF SOUGHT
The Appellant's conviction should be reversed and a new
trial should be ordered.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

day of April, 1988.

WALTER F. BUGDEN, JR.,
Attorney for Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, four (4) true
and correct copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellant, first
class postage prepaid, this

day of April, 1988, to:

Russell L. Mahan
Bountiful City Prosecutor
745 South Main
Bountiful, Utah 84010
Attorney for Plaintiff/Respondent
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
ooOoo
BOUNTIFUL CI^Y,
Plaintiff/Respondent,
v.

:
:

AGREED STATEMENT AS THE
RECORD ON APPEAL

:

JF<;<5E

G. PAT OMTNO
D?fendant/Apoellant

:

Case No.

:
ooOoo

Tn^ Aopellant, Jesse G. Palomino, bv and through his counsel,
Walter F. Bugden, Jr. f and the City of Bountiful, by and through
its counsel, Russell Mahan, hereby stipulate and agree pursuant
to Rul=» lift) of tn<=> ntah Rules of Appellate Procedure, that the
follownq statement of Facts constitutes the agreed statement as
the record on appeal:
1.

^n November 10, 1987, while on routine patrol at the

area o. 300 Ease and 500 South, Bountiful City Police Officer
James Garner observed a cream colored Dodge Aspen parked on the
Morth side of the street ^ith the front of said vehicle facing
Fastbound although the vehicle was in the Westbound lane.
2.

The officer observed the Appellant seated in the driver's

seat oF the vehicle.
3.

When aske3 what the problem was, the Appellant stepped

-1-

from the driver's side of the car and stated that he had spun
around on the road and was merely attempting to get the vehicle
started so he could get on his way.
4.

The officer detected several beer cans on the floor of

the Apnellant's vehicle.
5.

The officer also observed a strong odor of alcohol

coming from the Appellant's breath and from the interior of the
car.
6.

A second Bountiful City Police Officer, Officer Stones,

responded to the scene, and administered field sobriety tests to
the Appellant.

Tt was the opinion of both Officer Garner and

Officer Stones that the Appellant failed to adequately perform any
of the field sobriety tests.
7.

The Appellant was placed under arrest for Driving Under

the IncLaence of an Alcoholic Beverage and was transported to the
Bountiful City Police Department.

At the oolice station, the

Appellant was requested to submit to an intoxilyzer test.
Although the Appellant stated that he understood the request to
submit to a chemical test, the Appellant nonetheless refused to
submit to such a test.
8.

The Appellant testified on his own behalf.

The Appellant

testified that he drove to Wendover, Nevada and on the return from
Wendo^?r the Appellant admitted consuming two beers.

The Appellant

also admitted that he was the driver of the vehicle that both
Officers Garner and atones observed in Bountiful Cicy.
9.

The Appellant further admitted opening a beer after his

-?_

vehicle ran out of gas and drinking about half of that beer prior
to the time that Officer Garner arrived at the scene.
10.

After the Court had instructed the jury, but prior to

the City's counsel delivering his closing argument, the City's
counsel requested that the Court include in the elements instruction to the iury that the Appellant could be found guilty of
Driving Under the Influence if the jury concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that the Appellant was either driving a motor vehicle
or in actual physical control of a motor vehicle while under the
influence of an alcoholic beverage.
11.

Defense counsel did not object to the City's requested

instruction, but urged the Court to instruct the jury on the
meaning of actual physical control.
12.

The Court took a recess and invited defense counsel to

prepare such an instruction.

Defense counsel did prepare an

instruction and submitted it to the Court.
qiv« s^M

The Court refused to

instruction to the jury and defense counsel excepted to

the Court's refusal.
l^.

The jury returned a verdict of guilty.

14.

The Aooell^nt moved the Court for a new trial on the

basis of the Court's refusal to instruct the jury on the meaning
of actual physical control.

An Order denying the Appellant's

-3-

Motion For A New Trial was signed by the Court on February 22,
1998
rO
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DATED t h i s _ J 2 ^ 1 _ day of - F e b r u a r y ,
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1988
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* C > *- f f,

<.

RUSSELL MAHAN,
Attorney Cor Respondent

WALTER F. BUGDEN, JR. ,
Attorney for Appellant < I
Approved as to form:
DATED:
FOURTH CTRCUTT COURT:

JUDGE MARK S. JOHNSON
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